Introduction

In the contemporary world, characterized by an increasing interconnectedness among all human civilizations, it is vital to understand the phenomenon of globalization, what it means to live in a global culture, and what our roles are as transnational citizens of the world. As the abilities of our advancing human population increase to allow for a greater sense of connection between individual human civilizations—aided by technology, such as communication technologies (mass media and computerization) and transportation technologies^[1]—conflicts between the preservation of, and respect for, the particularities of individual cultures and the encroachment of outside values have become a significant part of our changing world. Though some theorists take opinionated stances encouraging the positive effects of a globalized world society—a hyperglobalist approach^[2]—and others take the opposing side, vilifying it for its detrimental effects on the uniqueness of human civilizations—a theorist of the cultural imperialism perspective would take this approach, potentially^[3]—the fact of the matter is that it is occurring and we are faced with the responsibility to understand what our role is in this new globalized society. One way to understand the issues associated with the effects of globalization on particular cultures is to assess the juncture between religion and globalization. In this paper, I will focus on the intersection between an agent of globalization (news media) and a particularly significant and influential element of culture: religion, and specifically, Islam. For this paper, I pose the research question: What is the news media’s role when presented with a conflict between a particular religion and the secular, pluralistic, global culture of today?

Due to the futility of presenting research wherein key concepts—with debated meanings—are not defined, this paper will provide definitions for “globalization” and “religion.” As central themes to the paper, it is necessary that these concepts be understood, despite the dispute among scholars and the complex ways these terms can be interpreted. The phenomenon of globalization is elusive when it is used as a term among scholars, as it is sometimes referred to as a theory and, at other times, as a process. For the purposes of this paper, the term “globalization” will refer to the “rapid developments in communications technology, transport and information which bring the remotest parts of the world within easy reach.^[4]” Further, “globalization” will refer to “an ever more interconnected global economy, with vast social and political implications.^[5]” While globalization has been interpreted as a process of homogenizing effects, such that the spread of American pop culture, Western methods of living, and secular ideology will infiltrate and overturn all other forms of cultural expression^[6], this phenomenon cannot eradicate diversity. It is a change in the way we view our world and the way we view ourselves as participants within our world, but differences between groups of people and their sense of place in the world will always exist^[7].

Religion, for instance, illuminates a facet of culture wherein the potential for differences exists. To define “religion,” John Hick’s definition from his essay entitled, “The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,” will be used. Though there have been numerous scholars of religious studies and related fields who have tackled the daunting task of defining religion—E.B. Tylor and J.G. Frazer, Sigmund Freud, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Max Weber, William James, Mircea Eliade, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Clifford Geertz, and countless others^[8]—Hick’s definition suits the purposes of this paper best. He defines “religion” as “an understanding of the universe, together with an appropriate way of living within it, which involves reference beyond the natural world to God or gods or to the Absolute or to a transcendent order or process^[9].” This definition includes theistic faiths—such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and theistic Hinduism—and nontheistic faiths—such as Theravada Buddhism and nontheistic Hinduism—but excludes particular ideologies that have been argued to be a “secular version of religion,” like Marxism, communism, or humanism^[10][11].

Due to the phenomenon of globalization in this modern age, cultures comprised of their own individualized methods of living, ideologies—secular and/or religious—norms, customs, practices, and beliefs are interacting with one another more frequently within the global landscape. A crucial agent in the exchange of cultural ideas, whereby cultures can learn of each other’s values and of important events, is the news media^[12]. I initially chose to explore the intersection of the news media and Islam due to my fascination with the Charlie Hebdo case study, wherein a French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, republishes a series of cartoons “depicting the Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist with a bomb^[13]” and a group of Muslims who took offense to the cartoons responded with violence, bombings, an arson attack, and attempted murder and terrorism^[14]. While the event itself was horrific, I saw the event as an unfortunate conflict between two paradoxical, cultural ideologies^[15] and was presented with a personal conundrum—which is more important: freedom of expression or freedom of religion? In my personal opinion, both are—or should be—universal rights; but when the two come into conflict, such that it seems as though only one is allowed to prevail in any given society, how do we, as citizens of a fighting, global culture satisfy all parties?

Hoping to explore the relationship between the global and the local further, I decided to focus on a particular religion (Islam) for this paper, due to the strong reaction many Muslims have expressed against this new age of a global, pluralistic culture^[16]. The specific research question posed is significant in that its intention is to provide an avenue for navigating conflicting cultural ideologies, without clipping either of its freedoms. Understanding the topics presented within this paper—religion, globalization, religion in the media, religion’s role within the secular press, Islam vs. the media, Islam’s position within the postmodern and globalizing world, freedom of expression vs. freedom of religion, and violence against the media—and pursuing research within these fields is essential to preserve the hybridity and plurality of this new global culture, while maintaining respect for all individual cultures.

The overwhelming amount of literature on this topic has altered the focus of this paper from a specific analysis of the Charlie Hebdo case study to a paper divided among three themes that must be addressed and understood if the proposed research question has hope for an answer. The literature, filtered into three themes—The Globalization Phenomenon vs. A Cultural Particularity: Islam; Perceptions of Islam in the Media; and Freedom of Religion vs. Freedom of Expression: Who is Right?—will be analyzed through the globalization of culture theoretical framework in order to understand the relationship between the global and the local, as well as the use, role, and appropriation of media within this relationship^[17]. First, I evaluate literature that seeks to analyze the relationship between Islam and its placement within the global society, so that the assessment of where, specifically, the potential for conflict lies can be understood within a global framework. Next, I explore literature that addresses the ways in which Islam has been portrayed in the media in the past, as well as Muslim reactions to this portrayal, since understanding what role the news media should play within this relationship cannot be accurately discussed until it is understood the role it has played and how that has fared. Lastly, I explore literature that discusses the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of religion and the future of this relationship. By evaluating the literature from these three angles, I hope to be able to situate the problems within a more contextualized framework so that there is a greater understanding of all elements of the issue, and so that light can be shed on the Charlie Hebdo case study and similar events.

Summary of Theoretical Framework

Though there are a variety of theoretical frameworks with which the relationship between the global and the local—and, specifically, the intersection of Islam and the news media—can be analyzed, the globalization of culture theoretical framework will be used most predominantly within this paper. As a globalization of culture theorist, Rainer Winter and his essay entitled, “Global Media, Cultural Change, and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,^[18]” provides a basis for understanding the relationship between the global culture and the particularities of individual human civilizations and the mass media’s role today. In addition to this theoretical framework, supporting theories outlined by the literature presented in this paper—systems theory^[19] and macro-level theory^[20]—serve to support the use of the globalization of culture theory in answering the research question.

In order to address the research question posed, the effects of the globalization phenomenon on the locality of cultures must be understood. The theoretical lens of the globalization of culture theory provides the most realistic and relevant conceptualization of the interactions and hybridization^[21] occurring within the contemporary global culture—and will be utilized throughout all three themes, but most explicitly within the first theme. Winter argues that the current predominant view in globalization literature that states “the worldwide diffusion of mass culture is destroying the uniqueness of regional cultures^[22]” is detrimental to the understanding of the current global media culture and its role. Despite the fear of a mass culture spreading “conformity, passivity, political apathy, racism, and violence,” spurred by the infiltration of the American lifestyle throughout the rest of the world^[23], Winter—and the globalization of culture theory—points out that the appropriation of cultural goods and media within other cultures has not been accurately investigated. To genuinely realize the effects of the globalization phenomenon on individual cultures, local reception processes^[24] must be investigated.

Ultimately, the “appropriation^[25]” of goods, images, ideas, practices, or beliefs does not serve to create a single, homogenous global culture, but they interact with each other: the global postmodern era is characterized by difference, plurality, and hybridity^[26]—not unlike the entire history of planet Earth. Globalization, as a structure, is simultaneously global and local, such that “symbols, signs and ideologies are singled out of their original contexts and gain a new meaning by mixing with other cultural elements.^[27]” Further, though some theorists would argue a cultural imperialist approach by which a sect of religion spreads throughout the world with homogenizing effects,^[28] religion is not shaped by Western cultural imperialism, is not disappearing within the new global culture, and serves to continue establishing difference throughout the world^[29]. Lastly, Winter presents the importance of mass/news media in its ability to create collective experiences, which has the potential to instill a sense of solidarity throughout a group or groups of people^[30]—tying in to the supporting theories used to address the research question.

While the globalization of culture theory serves to illuminate the relationship between the new global society and the particularities of culture, the other theories necessary for shedding light on the research question—systems theory and macro-level theory—serve to address the specific role of news media within this relationship. Kai Hafez, in his introduction to the book, Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World,^[31] argues that “the phenomenon of globalization must be conceptualized on different levels of theory building,^[32]” and that only through various levels of theoretical analysis can the news media’s role in the global culture be adequately understood in terms of whether a reform is necessary. Hafez asserts that “in mass communication, [systems theory] subscribes to the idea that the media are influential in setting the international agenda for public opinion.^[33]” Similarly, macro-level theory, while it can be applied differently within various contexts, is used to explain the potential of mass media to possess a dual nature: it “can either promote peace or deepen crises and reinforce conflict.^[34]” These two theoretical frameworks—used more explicitly in the second and third themes—will be used to address the research question since applying these theories directly relate to understanding the role of media within the relationship between the global and the local.

Literature Review

1. The Globalization Phenomenon vs. A Cultural Particularity: Islam

Before the literature regarding the position of Islam within the global culture is analyzed, Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory^[35] must be addressed. While Huntington asserts the viewpoint that conflict within the global, postmodern age will be marked by the clashing of cultures, understood to be largely fueled by and comprised of religious ideologies,^[36] the globalization of culture theory clarifies that the global, postmodern age will not be characterized by a clashing of civilizations, but by an integration of ideologies, and by the need to find “a middle way between universalism and the emphasis on particularities.^[37]” Thus, this section is not arguing that a clash of cultures or civilizations—i.e. “Islam vs. the West^[38]”—is necessary to understand the contemporary world, but that a clash between global changes and local cultures characterizes the modern age. Engaging with Huntington’s theory, Bassam Tibi in his book, Islam Between Culture and Politics, expresses his own interpretation of “civilizations” whereby intercivilizational dialogue will contribute to an international morality that will bypass the problem of a clash of civilizations altogether^[39]. As a scholar of International Relations, Tibi presents a framework for this theme’s discussion wherein three Islamic Studies scholars—Hichen Djait, Mushir Ul-Haq, and Asghar Ali Engineer—contextualize the relationship of Islam and the global culture with particular themes of the relationship.

In addressing the current global system wherein “the structural networks cover the levels of socio-economics, transport, and communication, but not that of culture,^[40]” Tibi asserts that there is no such thing as a homogenized and standardized international society. With the globalization of culture theory implicit in his work, Tibi makes a lot of the same points that Winter and this paper have already made, and “look[s] at Islam within the broader…conditions of globalization.^[41]” To address the locality of culture within the global framework, Tibi expresses the need to have a greater understanding of cultural systems, as well as a reformation of all religion—specifically Islam—to prevent the clash of civilizations^[42]. In asking whether the Islamic civilization, “determined by pre-industrial standards and yet unreformed^[43]” has the ability to exist alongside cultural modernity—and whether religious values are in revolt against the “ongoing rapid global changes^[44]”—he searches for the solution within the process of secularization. He proposes that global peace requires the development of worldwide egalitarian structures, wherein the contrasting trends of advanced, industrial societies—characterized by secularization—and developing societies—“characterized by mass insecurity^[45]” and fundamentalist values—can coexist only when the universality of reason has been successfully instilled within each particularity (i.e. individual culture). In applying pluralism to the global intercultural setup, Tibi claims “commonalities based on…interculturally valid norms and values^[46]” will necessarily lead to equality and democratization. Further, secularization of religions—defined simply as a separation of religion from political life^[47]—will allow for cultural systems to partake in rationalization without succumbing to blind faith. Ultimately, Tibi does not call for the abolishment of religion, but for the de-politicization of it—or the secularization of it—so that rationality and secular tolerance will be upheld as ultimate values within an international justice system that serves to navigate “the dichotomy of structural globalization and cultural self-assertion^[48]” that characterizes the present world.

Just as Tibi calls for a secularization of Islam within the global framework, Djait similarly argues that Islam needs a reformulation in order to associate “itself with new dimensions of affectivity and reason,^[49]” but it is up to them to “redefine the essence of the Islamic design.^[50]” In the confrontation of Islamic society and the modern world, Djait’s essay entitled, “Islam, Reform, and the New Arab Man,” calls for a reformation of “religious order, rationalization of the individual, [and] mutation in society.^[51]” Though, up to the present, religion has been intertwined with society, whereby the two mutually affect each other, Djait argues that the collective mentality of contemporary society must be secularized^[52]. Ul-Haq and Engineer discuss the relationship between Islam and secularization further.

Though both Tibi and Djait call for a reform of Islam to coincide with the contemporary global changes, Ul-Haq and Engineer present opposing viewpoints regarding Islam’s ability for reform at all. In presenting a historical analysis of India and Indian Muslims as the two understand secularism and the secular state, Ul-Haq posits that religion, to Muslims, is not just a set of moral values, but is an institution of Islamic law: Shari’a^[53]. Faith must be presented in action which is understood through the rules and regulations of the Qur’an; Islamic Shari’a law and faith are inseparable^[54]. With this understanding, the politicization of Islam that Tibi mentions is apparent, whereby secularization as a doctrine is incompatible with Islam. A distinction between secularization and the secular state must be made, however, such that Ul-Haq asserts the secular state can be accepted or rejected on the basis of Shari’a. Separating Indian Muslims into two categories, Ul-Haq makes the argument that secularization can coexist with religion as a faith within the first category of Indian Muslims—the modern, educated Muslims—while it cannot coexist with the ulama, who assert that religion is both faith and Shari’a, and Shari’a and secularization are incompatible^[55]. Thus, until the ulama accept secularism, the two will remain at odds^[56].

Engineer makes the opposite claim, putting forth a definition of liberal secularism and argues by way of textual analysis of the Qur’an and the Islamic tenets, that Islam and secularism already do mesh with each other and it is crucial for the modern world that they do^[57]. Essentially, he argues that the potential for Islam and secularism to coexist depends on the particular interpretation of both; if both Islam and secularism are interpreted liberally, “there should not be any problem with Islam in a secular setup.^[58]” The definition of liberal secularism he presents does not insist on a belief in atheism, promotes pluralism and respect for all faiths, guarantees full freedom of religion for all citizens, and guarantees equal rights for all citizens, “irrespective of one’s caste, creed, race, language or faith.^[59]” Within his textual analysis of the Qur’an, Engineer asserts that Islam upholds the first two of the four claims of liberal secularism.

According to Engineer, the Qur’an states that every people have their own law, their own way of worshipping God, and that no religious place—synagogue, church, or monastery—should be destroyed but should instead be protected; thus, Islamic tenets “do not disapprove of a composite or pluralistic way of life.^[60]” Further, since the Qur’an does not refer to any concept of state, nor does it promote an obligation toward a religious state, there are Muslim majority countries that allow non-Muslims to have equal rights—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan before Zia-ul-Haq’s time. There is, however, a truth to the argument that Muslims are reluctant to accord equal citizenship rights^[61]. Thus, Engineer calls for a reformulation of the rights of non-Muslims but asserts the lack of equal rights is not the fault of Islam. Though Muslim countries banish democratic and human rights discourses, “the lack of democracy and human rights is not because of Islam or Islamic teachings but due to authoritarian and corrupt regimes which totally lack transparency in governance.^[62]” He concludes that Islamic teachings are not against the concept of human rights and individual freedom, but that “Islam upholds pluralism, freedom of conscience and human and democratic rights and thus does not clash with the concept of secularism.^[63]” Lastly, in direct opposition to what Ul-Haq claimed, Engineer argues that the ulama “accepted secular principles of governance and never objected to it,^[64]” and they even urge Muslim masses to vote for secular parties. Though a variety of critical, and possibly conflicting, phenomena, processes, and ideologies were presented within the literature of these four authors—such as pluralism, secularization, liberal secularism, and reformulation of religion—the literature addressed multiple intersections wherein the potential for conflict exists in regards to the particularities of culture as they interact with the contemporary global changes.

2. Perceptions of Islam in the Media

The literature presented in this section focus entirely on the American media’s portrayal of Muslims, Islam, Arabs, and the Middle East to assess the effectiveness of the media’s ability to navigate conflicts, should they arise. Two pieces of literature—“The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” by Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski and “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” by Melani McAlister—conduct textual analyses of various pieces of U.S. media to assess the position these media pieces have within the greater sociopolitical context^[65]. The next two pieces of literature—“U.S. Coverage of Islam,” by Lawrence Pintak and “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: the Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” by Karim H. Karim—both focus on the portrayal of Muslims after September 11^th, as well as on the limitations and shortcomings of the American news media in their oversimplification of outside cultures^[66]. Though these four pieces of literature take different approaches to analyzing the media’s role, they all address its significance in the construction of transnational identities^[67] and the horrific results its failures can produce should it contribute to a history of injustice perpetrated against any one culture. With this understanding, the literature within this section utilize systems theory and macro-level theory to understand how the media creates international public opinion and how its influential nature has the power to cause wars^[68].

Arguing for the necessity to study media representation of various social and cultural groups, Lind and Danowski discuss how the reports themselves “are inextricably linked to the reporter’s perceptions.^[69]” Thus, the stereotypes within media are part of a larger historical context that, through a content analysis of TV and radio content—aired on ABC, CNN, PBS, and NPR from February 1993 to February 1996^[70]—can be assessed at the micro-level. Focusing on transcripts of approximately 35,000 hours of content, this specific content analysis—“Danowski’s Wordlink Program^[71]”—provides a qualitative analysis through quantitative procedures; by looking at the extent to which specific words appear in close proximity to one another, the macro-level meanings within these electronic media sources and this time frame are apparent. In general, they hoped to: discover the relationship among words within messages; interpret the underlying themes within representations of Arabs; discern the frequency with which certain attitudes were associated with Arabs; and provide concrete patterns of Arabs in the U.S. press^[72].

Citing Jack Shaheen’s 1984 study regarding Arab portrayal in the media and his findings suggesting there are four myths surrounding Arabs, Lind and Danowski performed a statistical analysis of word co-occurences within these myths. These four myths are: Arabs are fabulously wealthy; Arabs are barbaric and uncultured; Arabs are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery; and Arabs revel in terrorism^[73]. The results found a total of 7,801 references to Arabs, which is only 0.00575% of all words during that time period. Thus, the little coverage of Arab culture suggests their culture is ignored or unimportant to the American people, allowing for a “fertile field [of] negative stereotyping.^[74]” Of the coverage they did find, there was most co-occurrence between the words “Arab/s” or “Arabian” and words associated with barbarism. There was a total of 1,164 word pairings, which accounts for 14.9% of all Arab references. Overall, the findings of this content analysis suggest that the American public received very little information about Arabs, but what depictions they were receiving “served mostly to reinforce the predominant stereotypes delineated in prior research.^[75]” While this study did not answer what the role of the news media should be, it has presented what role it has played, which is that of a breeding ground where stereotypes and racism are abundant.

Conducting a textual analysis of five well-known images taken between September 2001 and Summer of 2004—from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib^[76]—McAlister, his essay title “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” similarly presents the ability of micro-level analyses to illuminate the construction of identities and meaning within an historical context^[77]. She argues that, over time, the reproduction of certain photographs may actually serve to abstract the events they depict, “to make them seem less real as events precisely because they are so familiar as images.^[78]” The first image, “Firemen Raising the Flag,” depicts three white firemen at the World Trade Center on 9/11 attaching an American flag to a leaning pole. Taken by Thomas Franklin, this image became a symbol of American resilience and bravery after the 9/11 attacks, heroic masculinity, “American-ness,” and represented the ideal American^[79]. As icons of the “lower-middle-class working man” these firefighters became crystallized with what it meant to be American; additionally, it was linked with the negatives of nationalism, aggressive patriotism, and the American justification for revenge militarism^[80]. The second image, “Osama bin Laden,” is a still from a video released on October 7, 2001, wherein he is shown in a traditional headdress with a rifle by his side. As the war on terrorism’s most potent symbol, bin Laden, and his performance on the tape—expressing a chilling combination of piety and militarism^[81]—represented the “cruelty of what Al-Qaeda did, of what terrorists do.^[82]” As an icon, bin Laden became a justification for President Bush’s self-proclaimed transformation of the position of the U.S. within the global culture.

The third image, “Afghan Women in Burqas,” depict women covered head-to-toe in a heavy blue fabric with a small vent for their faces. Also present in the photo is a young girl—face, uncovered—in the middle of the group; she seems to represent “what has been lost to these women…the energy and sexuality that the burqa is presumed to have destroyed.^[83]” Symbolizing the Taliban’s power, this image, presenting the women to be “the silent treatment to her own oppression,^[84]” was often shown in conjunction with images of Condoleezza Rice. As a woman who had come from great oppression herself, Rice, as a symbol, represented the exact opposite of the Afghan women—free, strong, and independent. The fourth picture, “Saddam Hussein’s Statue Comes Down in Baghdad,” represented an iconic symbol of the liberation of Baghdad, but was staged and presented very misleading information. Though it implied Iraqi soldiers had toppled the statue, a U.S. marine colonel had actually done the damage; seeing an “opportunity,^[85]” Army psychological operations officers gathered the Iraqi children to sit on the tank in the photo and made it appear as though the crowd was larger than it was in reality. Though the image was initially powerful, its outright fabrication of actual events represented “cheering Iraqis who were imported onto the scene and then named its protagonists.^[86]” The fifth, and final image, “Prisoner at Abu Ghraib,” depicts a man in a black hood and robe standing on cardboard boxes with outstretched arms and electrodes on his hands and genitals. This was one of a dozen photos taken at the Abu Ghraib prison where the U.S. Army Reserve brutalized Iraqi prisoners; though this was not the most horrific photo, “it was a particularly haunting one.^[87]” Though the hood was black, it resembled that of the KKK, whereas his outstretched arms presented a classic reference to that of Jesus on the cross; “his pose, his dress and hood, and obvious violence being threatened him stood as stark reminders of the links that connected this moment of violence in Iraq to the history of racial violence in the U.S. and to the Christian beliefs that had been used both to justify that violence and to organize opposition to it.^[88]”

Similar to the images of McAlister’s textual analysis—in their vivid portrayal of U.S. beliefs and values regarding Muslims—Pintak, in his essay, “U.S. Coverage of Islam,” discusses the U.S. media’s long history of distortions and misconceptions regarding the Middle East and Muslims. Analyzing the ways in which the U.S. media’s news stories “primed its audience to support the war,^[89]” Pintak mainly focuses on the news media after 9/11. Essentially, he argues that Americans did not have the basic knowledge required to understand what was occurring in international news, which contributed to them “tuning out,” which led to the unincentivized media to cover such issues^[90]. This vicious cycle, Pintak argues, was perpetuated in four main ways. First, the U.S. news organizations would not allow their reporters to stay in the Middle East for extended periods of time to gather more details, conduct more interviews, gain expertise in the region, or have a broader understanding of the cultural context. Second, the U.S. media, in catering “to the appetite of its audience,^[91]” tends to use generic photos of Muslims praying to illustrate stories about extremism in terror, which present horrifically misleading information regarding Muslims, Islam, and their culture. Third, in utilizing media theory, journalists rely on “news frames^[92]” that simplify news to fit into existing societal concepts; in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. media fell back on the stereotyped framing narrative of Arabs and Muslims as “the bad guy.^[93]” Fourth, journalistic self-censorship also serves to present a misleading version of reality: though, before 9/11 the U.S. media actively participated in the parodying of “Bushspeak,^[94]” the “media reached an unspoken agreement^[95]” in the months after, whereby they framed Bush as more presidential to garner greater national support for their president and create a sense of bondedness within the nation.

Though the entirety of the Muslim world is not always, consistently, viewed as a singular threat, Karim argues—in a similar vein to all other authors within this section—that the overall idea about Muslims within the U.S. “is that they are the Other against whom the collective Self should be on guard^[96]” and that this view is perpetuated by the prejudice American media. In looking at portrayals of Muslims after 9/11, Karim argues the U.S. media contributes to the stereotypes of Muslims and Islam in a variety of ways. For instance, after 9/11 there was an overwhelming tendency among many forms of American media (newspapers, television, and radio) to adopt Bush’s declaration that “you are either with us, or against us;^[97]” this served to create a polarizing worldview among Americans within which anyone with the slightest connection to Islam was perceived to be a threat and to be viewed only with suspicion and fear. Additionally, the use of images portraying women wearing hijabs, men wearing cloaks and turbans, people prostrating in Islamic prayer, or masses of people performing hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca intended to incite an affective response as they were paired with stories describing the criminal activities of terrorists, or “Islamists.^[98]” Lastly, in covering the 9/11 attacks, journalists had diverged from the usual “well-rehearsed and controlled coverage of a scheduled live event…[as] the massive loss of life shook observers’ cognitive foundations of reality.^[99]” Essentially, one story with one perspective followed the events whereby journalists failed to provide context or nuance. Karim discusses that this was not the case for all journalists, however; Karen Armstrong—a scholar and writer of religious militancy in Islam—attempted to explain the broader context of conflicts on television, but her comments were swatted aside by interviewers who only sought confirmation for their perceptions regarding the “endemically violent Islam.^[100]” Though utilizing different foci and methods of analyses, the four pieces of literature discussed in this section arrive at very similar conclusions regarding the (U.S.) news media’s current role in the perpetuation of conflict.

3. Freedom of Religion vs. Freedom of Expression: Who is Right?

While the previous section’s literature focuses heavily on the various ways in which the news media does little to alleviate the tension lines between culture and the contemporary phenomenon of globalization—and actually serves to aggravate the differences between ideologies—this section focuses on the ideal future of journalism in relation to the particularities of religion. The authors of this section present a variety of themes—the historically religious underpinnings of the secular media, censorship of journalism (past and present), cultural relativism, the absolutism of freedom of expression, and recommendations for future journalists—that serve to determine the relationship between religion and journalism by highlighting their fundamental interrelatedness.

Presenting a historical perspective on the formation of contemporary journalism, Doug Underwood, in his book entitled, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, outlines misconceptions regarding the birth of journalism, the link between freedom of religion and freedom of expression, and the moral imperative of contemporary journalists. He begins by stating Walter Ong’s—a Jesuit priest and media theorist—claim that the media furthers the cause of religious progress “by bringing us close together as a world community, making it easier to understand our many different cultures and advancing peace through open channels of communication.^[101]” He goes on to discuss George Fox—the founder of the Quaker movement—and his role in the birth of modern journalism, Underwood states that Fox led a radical campaign and called for a reform against the upsurge of polemic religious literature in the Protestant-dominated Long Parliament of England in 1643^[102]. Additionally, he discusses how the Protestant siege of the English government in 1649, the beheading of the “Catholic-sympathizer^[103]” Charles I, and the establishment of the theocratic government that unsuccessfully attempted to unite a nation divided by religion ultimately served as the “breeding ground for the modern newspaper.^[104]” Though, in the present secular times, it is forgotten that many advocates for the early freedom of press “ were preachers and proselytizers whose religious zeal…placed them solidly in the tradition of the world’s first journalists,^[105]” Underwood discusses prophetic journalism’s role in modern journalism. Defined as journalism of passion, polemic, and moral opinion, “prophet journalism^[106]” was combined with the contemporary capitalist system to create modern journalism; it is found today on the editorial page and within opinion publications. Further, Underwood argues that though there is a tendency to view 20^th century journalism as an outgrowth of the Enlightenment and rationalism, the history of the printing press tells a different story. In its first 300 years, the printing press served to dispense new ideas about Christianity, the gospel, and the rights of humankind. Though censorship imposed by the church began to relax within the modern age, public opinion took its place and became the dictator of free speech restraints^[107]. Essentially, Underwood proposes that prophetic journalism, with its advent in 17^th century religiously-dominated England, and coupled with the rise of capitalism, created modern journalism, wherein journalists today have the moral imperative “to do the kind of journalism that challenges injustice, demands of others the highest ethical standards, and yet is sensitive to the human consequences of their work.^[108]”

In Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media, John Dart and Jimmy Allen make a similar claim regarding the responsibility of contemporary journalists. In discussing the divide between journalism and religion, Dart and Allen articulate that it is ironic there is such discord—since both are protected under the same constitutional amendment^[109]—but yet, it is inevitable, as the two ideological institutions react to the changing world around them. In conducting a 9-month long study, Dart and Allen sought to determine the causes and cures of the discontent^[110]. Essentially, they found that: there is an unhealthy distrust and fear between religionists and journalists; the clergy was convinced news coverage of religion is biased and unfairly negative; there was “more ignorance about religion than bias in the average newsroom^[111];” and there were too few full-time religion reporters to provide in-depth coverage. Additionally, they found that in the newsroom, there are attitudes of prejudice toward religion and religious people, since they are viewed as “loyal to anachronistic doctrines and authoritarian organizations.^[112]” The strong, ideological views that religious people have accounts for the vast amount of criticism a press receives, especially regarding editorial cartoons^[113]. Grossly overstating their views, editorial cartoonists intend to create pieces that outrage, amuse, or shock, though these tend to incite extreme anger and action within those of the opposing view.

After pointing out the various discrepancies between religionists and journalists, Dart and Allen propose a variety of recommendations for both ideological groups of people. For the news media, Dart and Allen suggest that they take religion more seriously, increase their journalistic sources, and provide journalists with opportunities for continuing education in the area of religion. For religionists, they propose they learn what journalists consider newsworthy and communicate religious actions and events within that definition, provide the news media with easy access to their informed viewpoint, and take responsibility for correcting misinformation^[114]. Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, in their article, “Responsible Journalism,” similarly argues that the ethical responsibility of journalists is to “seek to acknowledge and understand anxiety but not to pander to it and inflame it into…moral panic,^[115]” and provides a series of recommendations as well. They suggest that the media should regard it as their duty to promote informed debate about the nature of multiculturalism, publish a greater range of opinion regarding Muslims, hire more Muslims, and seek out more sources and reliable information. Additionally, they argue that it is not only the responsibility of the news media, but also of the other elite institutions. Thus, they encourage organizations, projects, and programs concerned with race relations—specifically, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)—to take action regarding anti-Muslim hostility and education institutions to develop extensive media literacy and religious literacy programs. While Dart and Allen argued that conflict between journalism and religion is inevitable, Petley and Richardson argue the conflict between Islam and the West is inevitable^[116].

Focusing specifically on the Muslim population in the U.K., Petley and Richardson discuss the “Danish caricatures controversy^[117]” of 2006—which ultimately led to the Charlie Hebdo case. They explain that no national paper in the U.K. chose to reprint the cartoons, as these papers articulated it did not fit with their principles of responsible journalism. In arguing that freedom of expression is not absolute, a leader of the Independent stated, “There is no doubt that newspapers should have the right to print cartoons that some people find offensive…But there is an important distinction to be made between having a right and choosing to exercise it.^[118]” Therefore, under what circumstances should the media exercise restraint versus exercise their right to freedom of expression? In regards to the Danish cartoons, U.K. newspapers proposed three principles to illuminate this question. First, they expressed there should be a desire not to cause distress, insecurity, or fear, since there is “no merit in causing gratuitous offence.^[119]” Second, they argue the first principle is especially important in regards to groups of people who are vulnerable to hate crimes, discrimination, or exclusion from public life and employment. Third, they articulate that the papers are responsible for upholding standards of courtesy and respect, “with intentions to promote thoughtful discussion in a diverse but inclusive society.^[120]” Ultimately, Ziauddin Sardar of the Independent on Sunday explained that there are limits of free speech, which “are to be found in the social consequences, the potential harm to others of an exercise of free speech.^[121]” But, is this not the contemporary censorship that Underwood proposes replaced church-imposed censorship from the 17^th century?

In “Political Correctness Gone Mad,” by Hugh Muir, Julian Petley and Laura Smith, the discussion of contemporary censorship is further understood through the widespread use of the term “political correctness” which, in its current pejorative sense, dates to the beginning of the 1990’s in the U.S.^[122] In May of 1991, President Bush, in speaking at the University of Michigan, claimed that political correctness “replaces old prejudices with new ones. It declares certain topics off-limits, certain expression off-limits, even certain gestures off-limits. What began as a cause for civility has soured into a cause of conflict and even censorship.^[123]” Essentially, Muir, Petley, and Smith argue that “political correctness” provided a way of dismissing criticism and stifling critical discourse, “all the while claiming to fight a conspiracy to destroy freedom of speech.^[124]” Citing Anthony Browne and his book, The Retreat of Reason, Muir, Petley and Smith explain how Browne links the term to Britain’s Muslim population and states that “it automatically and unquestioningly supports those who it deems victims, irrespective of whether they merit it, and opposes the powerful, irrespective of whether they are malign or benign.^[125]” Further, Browne posits that since the Holocaust, the Jews were portrayed as the ultimate victims, with anti-Semitism being the ultimate bigotry; since 9/11 however, Muslims have become the ultimate victim and Islamophobia, the greatest bigotry. In this contemporary world, where political correctness, liberalism, and the ideological imperative that both freedom of expression and freedom of religion be simultaneously upheld, a more philosophical discussion regarding absolutism versus relativism may shine light on how to deal with the conflicts between these two ideologies.

In the chapter titled “The Value of Truth,” within his book, Free Speech, Alan Haworth discusses the contemporary emphasis regarding respect for cultural diversity and its effects in instilling fear in some who feel that allowing relativism “risks opening the door to some fearsome varieties of irrationalism and fundamentalism.^[126]” The majority of the chapter outlines value relativism and epistemic relativism—forms of cultural relativism—and their relationship with the human universal imperative of the right of free speech, or freedom of expression. While “value relativism” is the claim that values can vary across cultures, “epistemic relativism” maintains that the variations in epistemological standards are governed by cultural variations^[127]. Haworth discusses Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument that “we inhabit a social universe composed entirely of rival traditions, [in which] there are a number of contending, incompatible, but only partially and inadequately communicating, overall views of that universe.^[128]” Further, each tradition cannot justify its claims over those of the rivals; thus, liberalism “is just one item on a menu^[129]” and is a self-deceiving tradition. Though liberalism may have begun as an appeal to shared conceptions regarding rationality against the tyranny of traditions, “it has itself been transformed into a tradition.^[130]” Regarding the Salman Rushdie affair, Haworth argues we are positioned within a war with Western liberalism and the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam as two opposing football teams that we do not choose, but are raised into.

By way of conclusion, Haworth provides three closing remarks regarding cultural relativism and its effects on the absolutism of free speech. He states that value relativism threatens to undermine the absolutism of free speech since it suggests there is no rational foundation for preferring a liberal system of values—“in which free speech has privileged status^[131]”—to any other value system. Next, he claims epistemic relativism also threatens the absolutism of free speech since it implicates there is no “truth…to which the road of logical reason leads.^[132]” Remarking on the fear of being “plunged into an abyss of hopeless confusion…doomed to remain forever trapped in a valueless, truth-free, house of mirrors, where everything is just what we have made it to appear to be, and nothing more,^[133]” Haworth clarifies that there may not necessarily be a clear-cut line dividing absolutism and relativism due to the features of religious belief. He outlines that religious belief tends to be the property of a specific identifiable group, and, in order to hold one religious belief, one must also hold a whole series of other beliefs which are related to it and to the property of the specific identifiable group. Ultimately, since what counts as religious belief varies with culture and over time, Haworth makes the claim that what is perceived as absolute—moral or factual judgements to a culture—possess degrees of variation and constraints “on the degree to which variation is possible.^[134]” Presenting wildly different themes and perspectives, the literature of this section attempted to provide a basis for the clash between the freedom of expression and freedom of religion ideologies.

4. Critical Assessment of the Literature

Though dense and inclusive of a wide range of themes, the viewpoints of each piece of literature and the delineation of literature into the three sections was necessary in addressing the research question posed. Despite this, the literature does not lead to a clearly defined answer, but instead positions both the news media and Islam within the broader, global-culture context to attempt to discern where problems or clashes lie and what, if anything can be done about these potentials for conflict. Though the three sections presented within this literature review discuss distinctly different elements of both the news media and Islam, there seems to be consensus among the literature within each section regarding future actions to take when navigating conflicts.

Within section one: “The Globalization Phenomenon vs. A Cultural Particularity: Islam,” central themes presented within all four pieces of literature illuminate possible course of action. Both Tibi and Djait highlighted specific issues within Islam and called for its reformulation by way of secularization. Djait states: “The truth is that this modernity as sprung free from its country of origin and is now in universal orbit^[135]” and must be integrated into each particularity, each culture. Though neither of these authors discussed the Charlie Hebdo case study specifically, they would condemn the fundamentalist values and blind faith that ultimately led to a group of Muslims’ violence against the media, and instead value freedom of expression as absolute rights that Islam hinders. While Tibi argues that global peace can only exist by way of pluralism, within which fundamentalist Islam hasn’t a place, Engineer argues that Islamic teachings already do uphold pluralism as a value, and thus should not exhibit any problems when faced with the global culture. In presenting opposing views to Islam’s compatibility with secularism, Ul-Haq and Engineer, I believe, both present true statements regarding Islam’s ability to blend in with the contemporary global changes, as well as its extreme aversion to “modernity.” As a group of people presented in an overwhelmingly negative light within the U.S. news media, it follows that Muslims express an opposition to the global changes that, in their view, contribute to the perpetuation of worldwide violence. If it holds true, however, that Islam and secularism are incompatible, then there exists a great potential for conflict between the particularity of Islam and the global trend towards secularism. Therefore, the literature of section one calls for a reformulation of Islam so that it can assimilate into the contemporary global view of secularism.

The literature of section two, “Perceptions of Islam in the Media,” presents a distinctly different viewpoint: the sources of conflict between Islam and the global culture arise from the failures of the news media, specifically the U.S. media. As Pintak argues that the American media is a global media, all literature within this section present the various ways in which the U.S. media perpetuates stereotypes and oversimplifications of Muslims and their culture, and how this contributes to an uninformed and prejudice public opinion, as well as alienation and provoking of Muslims. Though some focused on the U.S. media coverage of 9/11 (Karim and McAlister), while others conducted textual analyses to discern the media pieces’ position within the larger sociohistorical context, all pieces of literature interacted with systems theory and macro-level theory in assessment of the news media’s ability to create or calm wars. Also, all pieces of literature provide some level of blame for the conflict between Islam and the global culture; while all blame U.S. news organizations/journalists/some form of news media, Karim specifically blames educational systems, Karim and Pintak blame users of the media, and McAlister blames pop culture. Ultimately, the literature within this section presents how the “dominant discourse [of news media] overshadows the presence of alternative perspectives,^[136]” and attempts to solve this problem by placing responsibility on particular news-affiliated groups.

The literature within the third section, “Freedom of Expression vs. Freedom of Religion: Who is Right?” presents wildly different methods to come to a sense of conclusion regarding this topic. What is significant is the interrelatedness of the themes within this section that serve to place the ideological conflicts presented within this paper in the greater sociohistorical and philosophical context. From this section of literature, it is apparent that censorship of journalism is not dead; that there is an essential link between religion and journalism, despite—and because of—these being paradoxical ideologies; and that views on cultural relativism can bring to light the absolutist value that liberalism imposes: free speech. Though these pieces of literature did not answer the section’s question—and were not expected to—most provided suggestions and recommendations for the future of journalism within the global culture. Thus, I argue that freedom of expression and freedom of religion are ideologies in conflict within the changing global culture, wherein both are right in their fight for existence in this modern world and both are wrong in their extreme opposition to each other.

Conclusion

The literature presented within this paper, with their accompanying themes, theoretical analyses, arguments, methods, and recommendations sought to provide greater insight to the news media’s role when presented with a conflict between Islam and the trend toward global secularism. In sum, the literature suggests that reforms need to be made both within Islam—to be compatible with secularism—and within the news media—to be more inclusive and accepting of cultures it is not a part of. Additionally, the literature found that there is a rational basis for Muslims’ aversion to modernity, as they are and have been continuously portrayed in a negative and condemning light. Finally, the literature suggests that freedom of expression and freedom of religion are merely opposing ideologies within a constantly opposing world, comprised of rival traditions, and that the values held dear contemporarily are subject to change over time. The news media has the potential to be both the answer and the continuation of the problem. In regards to the Charlie Hebdo case study, it would be wildly problematic to make an assertion regarding who was at fault, since the events represent intimate interrelations between two opposing ideologies that requires greater contextualized analysis. Regarding the chosen theoretical analyses—globalization of culture, systems theory, and macro-level theory—each was necessary in providing insight into the three sections presented in this paper. While the globalization of culture theory provides the most realistic lens to view the hybridization of the modern world, the systems theory and macro-level theory highlight the specific effect of the news media and their role in the global changes. This paper concludes that this new global culture can greatly benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the news media, with presentation of more sides of the story. In the contemporary, increasingly interconnected world, the distinct ideologies of freedom of religion and freedom of expression can greatly benefit from each other, if the two sides learn how to communicate. The best way to achieve this goal is through the telling of more stories, with the inclusion of more perspectives, within the international news media, so that—as Salmon Rushdie argues—“we, all of us, readers and writers and citizens and generals and godmen,^[137]” can have “the freedom to portray and analyze the struggle[s] between^[138]” all the contemporary global culture’s interacting ideologies.

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[1] Christof Demont-Heinrich, “Globalization,” (MFJS 4650: Global Communication and Media Class Lecture, Denver, CO, January 5, 2017).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Christof Demont-Heinrich, “Theorizing Global Communication and Media,” (MFJS 4650: Global Communication and Media Class Lecture, Denver, CO, January 10, 2017).

[4] Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, “Islam in the Age of Postmodernity,” In Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, edited by Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.

[5] Peter L. Berger, “Four Faces of Global Culture,” The National Interest, (no. 49 (1997): 419-427. berger-four-faces-global-culture.pdf), 419.

[6] Christof Demont-Heinrich, “Globalization and the Future of Identity: Transnational Identity(ies)?” (MFJS 4650: Global Communication and Media Class Lecture, Denver, CO, March 7, 2017).

[7] Doreen Massey, “A Global Sense of Place,” in Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of Inquiry, edited by Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory, 315-323. (London and New York: Hodder Headline Group, 1991), 319.

[8] Daniel Pals, Nine Theories of Religion, 3^rd edition, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[9] William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.

[10] Ernest Gellner, “Foreword,” In Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, edited by Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), xiii.

[11] William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.

[12] Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, “Islam in the Age of Postmodernity,” In Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, edited by Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 2.

[13] “Prophet Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: Timeline,” The Telegraph, (Last modified May 4, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341599/Prophet-Muhammad-cartoons-controversy-timeline.html).

[14] Ibid.

[15] John Cassidy, “Charlie Hebdo and the ‘Clash of Civilizations,’” The New Yorker, (Last modified January 8, 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/charlie-hebdo-clash-civilizations).

[16] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now, (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 78.

[17] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 207.

[18] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003).

[19] Kai Hafez, “The Middle East and Islam in Western Mass Media: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Reporting,” in Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World, edited by Kai Hafez, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000), 35.

[20] Kai Hafez, “The Middle East and Islam in Western Mass Media: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Reporting,” in Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World, edited by Kai Hafez, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000), 36.

[21] Stefan B. Kirmse, “In the Marketplace for Styles and Identities: Globalization and Youth Culture in Southern Kyrgyztan,” Central Asian Survey, (29: 4, (2010): 389-403. doi: 10.1080/02634937.2010.537138), 400.

[22] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 206.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 208.

[25] Christof Demont-Heinrich, “Cultural Imperialism vs. Globalization of Culture: Riding the Structure-Agency Dialectic in Global Communication and Media Studies,” Sociology Compass, (2011): 1-21, 8.

[26] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 219.

[27] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 217.

[28] Peter L. Berger, “Four Faces of Global Culture,” The National Interest, (no. 49 (1997): 419-427. berger-four-faces-global-culture.pdf), 425.

[29] Rainer Winter, “Global Media, Cultural Change and the Transformation of the Local: The Contribution of Cultural Studies to a Sociology of Hybrid Formations,” in Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Global America, edited by Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider, and Rainer Winter, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), 216.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Kai Hafez, Introduction to Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World, edited by Kai Hafez, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Kai Hafez, “The Middle East and Islam in Western Mass Media: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Reporting,” in Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World, edited by Kai Hafez, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000).

[34] Kai Hafez, “The Middle East and Islam in Western Mass Media: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Foreign Reporting,” in Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World, edited by Kai Hafez, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000).

[35] Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 93, 72:3 (1993): 1-19.

[36] Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 93, 72:3 (1993): 1-19, 1.

[37] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 109.

[38] Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 93, 72:3 (1993): 1-19, 6.

[39] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), x.

[40] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), ix.

[41]  Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 88.

[42] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 115.

[43] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 88.

[44] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 89.

[45] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 95-96.

[46] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 93.

[47] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 113.

[48] Bassam Tibi, Islam Between Culture and Politics, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 114.

[49] Hichem Dajit, “Islam, Reform, and the New Arab Man,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 123.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Hichem Dajit, “Islam, Reform, and the New Arab Man,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126.

[52] Hichem Dajit, “Islam, Reform, and the New Arab Man,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 124.

[53] Mushir Ul-Haq, “Islam in Secular India,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 133.

[54] Mushir Ul-Haq, “Islam in Secular India,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 134.

[55] Mushir Ul-Haq, “Islam in Secular India,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 134.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Asghar Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 138.

[58] Asghar Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13.

[59] Asghar Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 139.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62]  Asghar Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 141.

[63] Asghar Engineer, “Islam and Secularism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 141.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Christof Demont-Heinrich, “Textual and Content Analysis,” (MFJS 4650: Global Media and Communication Class Lecture, Denver, CO, February 28, 2017).

[66] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 117.

[67] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 267.

[68] Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 48.

[69] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 157.

[70] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 158.

[71] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 158.

[72] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 158.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 164.

[75] Rebecca Ann Lind and James A. Danowski “The Representation of Arabs in U.S. Electronic Media,” in Cultural Diversity and the U.S. Media, edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour and Theresa Carilli. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 165.

[76] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 267.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 268.

[79] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 273.

[80] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 276.

[81] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 276.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 280

[84] Ibid.

[85]  Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 293.

[86] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 293.

[87] Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 289.

[88]  Melani McAlister, “9/11 and After: Snapshots on the Road to Empire,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interestes in the Middle East Since 1945, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), 299.

[89] Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 48.

[90] Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 56.

[91] Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 37.

[92]  Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 38.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Lawrence Pintak, “U.S. Coverage of Islam.” Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam, and the War of Ideas, (London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 2006), 48.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 117.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 118.

[99] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 124.

[100] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 125.

[101] Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 16.

[102] Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 19.

[103] Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 20.

[104] Ibid.

[105]  Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 19.

[106] Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 21.

[107] Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 27.

[108]  Doug Underwood, From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 16.

[109] John Dart and Jimmy Allen, Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media, (Tennessee: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1994), 5.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

[112] John Dart and Jimmy Allen, Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media, (Tennessee: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1994), 13.

[113]John Dart and Jimmy Allen, Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media, (Tennessee: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1994), 14.

[114]  John Dart and Jimmy Allen, Bridging the Gap: Religion and the News Media, (Tennessee: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1994), 6.

[115] Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 258.

[116] Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 251.

[117] Ibid.

[118]  Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 252.

[119] Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 253.

[120] Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 254.

[121] Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, “Responsible Journalism,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 254.

[122]  Hugh Muir, Julian Petley, and Laura Smith, “Political Correctness Gone Mad,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 92.

[123] Ibid.

[124]  Hugh Muir, Julian Petley, and Laura Smith, “Political Correctness Gone Mad,” in Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the British Media, edited by Julian Petley and Robin Richardson. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), 93.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 84.

[127] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 113.

[128] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 90.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 91.

[131] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 114.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 115.

[135] Hichem Dajit, “Islam, Reform, and the New Arab Man,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 125.

[136] Karim H Karim, “American Media’s Coverage of Muslims: The Historical Roots of Contemporary Portrayals,” in Muslims and The News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 126.

[137] Alan Haworth, “The Value of Truth,” Free Speech, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 112.

[138] Ibid.